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SOCATS: WORST CASE ANALYSIS IN THE WEST
Tamzin G. Brown
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 1983, the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals handed down an opinion, Southern Oregon Citizens Against
Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark," which required the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) to prepare a worst case analysis' in its supplemental
environmental assessment (EA) when scientific uncertainty existed as to
the safety of a herbicide. This decision has provided a foundation for
subsequent National Environmental Policy Act3 (NEPA) challenges
brought against other federal agencies which have avoided the NEPA full
disclosure mandate. The Ninth Circuit's strong support of the NEPA
mandate heralded renewed commitment to hold federal agencies to
environmental accountability for their decisions.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1979, a group of concerned citizens in southern Oregon filed suit to
enjoin the BLM from spraying herbicides in the Medford District of
I. 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 446 (U.S. Nov. 13,1984) (No. 84-267)
[hereinafter cited as SOCATS].
2. The worst case analysis is mandated by the Council on Environmental Quality's regulation
promulgated in 1979, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1984).
§ 1502.22 Incomplete or unavailable information.
When an agency is evaluating significant adverse effects on the human environment in
an environmental impact statement and there are gaps in relevant information or scientific
uncertainty, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking or that
uncertainty exists.
(a) If the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice
among alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant,
the agency shall include the information in the environmental impact statement.
(b) If (I) the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice
among alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or
(2) the information relevant to adverse impacts is important to the decision and the means to
obtain it are not known (e.g., the means for obtaining it are beyond the state of the art) the
agency shall weigh the need for the action against the risk and severity of possible adverse
impacts were the action to proceed in the face of uncertainty. If the agency proceeds, it shall
include a worst case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbability of its
occurrence.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1982).
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western Oregon. The BLM was spraying various herbicides 4 to eliminate
brushy vegetation which competed with the economically preferable
Douglas fir. The BLM had prepared a programmatic environmental
impact statement (PEIS) in 1978 when it proposed the ten-year spraying
program. The PEIS was supplemented annually by EAs which updated the
PEIS on a site specific basis. The PEIS had discussed the human health
effects of Silvex, one of fourteen herbicides it was planning to use. It did not
discuss any of the other herbicides except to say that there was "no known
potential long term human health effects from the proposed action."5 The
plaintiffs, Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays (SOCATS),
alleged that this was an inadequate discussion of the potential human
health hazards, given the conflicting scientific data on the safety of the
herbicides involved, particularly 2,4-D. The district court agreed and
enjoined the spraying until a worst case analysis was prepared in a
supplemental EA.
The safety of herbicides was not a new issue in the Oregon courts. In
1977 the U.S. District Court of Oregon, in Citizens Against Toxic Sprays,
Inc. v. Berglund' (hereinafter CATS), enjoined the U.S. Forest Service
from spraying phenoxy herbicides 7 in the Siuslaw National Forest until the
agency had adequately addressed the environmental effects of its spraying
program. In CATS, the Forest Service argued that the plaintiffs were
requiring it to prove that phenoxy herbicides were safe or unsafe. The court
disagreed, holding that NEPA requires a discussion of uncertain adverse
environmental impacts, rather than proof of a chemical's relative safety.8
Neither NEPA nor the court sought to turn the agency into a chemical
analysis laboratory.
The CATS court presented an extensive overview of phenoxy herbi-
cides and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) continuing
problems with the herbicide 2,4,5-T. It noted that 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T and
Silvex accounted for 90% of all phenoxy production in the United States in
197 1.9 It mentioned public concern over TCDD (dioxin), a by-product of
4. The herbicides included Silvex, 2,4-D and 12 others. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1477.
5. Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Watt, No. 79-1098FR (D. Or. Sept.
9, 1982) [hereinafter SOCATS v. Watt].
6. 428 F. Supp. 908 (D. Or. 1977).
7. A phenoxy herbicide is one which contains a salt of phenol, which is an acidic compound. Of
the phenoxy herbicides, 2,4-D is the most extensively used. The 2,4-D compound commonly used in
forestry is low in water solubility but very soluble in oils. An oil soluble herbicide is more likely to be
absorbed through the skin than a water soluble one. Thus, accumulation of herbicides in an organism is
more likely to occur when the organism is exposed to persistent chemicals which have high oil solubility.
See generally, Norris, "The Behavior of Herbicides in the Forest Environment and Risk Assessment
(available from the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service) [hereinafter Norris].
8. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Berglund, 428 F. Supp. 908, 922 (D. Or. 1977).
9. Id. at 914.
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both Silvex and 2,4,5-T, whose adverse human health effects were
documented from the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam. Although
laboratory tests showed that dioxin caused birth defects in animals, the
EPA had not yet made any conclusive findings on the human health
hazards of phenoxy herbicides.10
The inconclusive data on the safety of phenoxy herbicide exposure was
a similar problem in SOCATS. The plaintiffs in SOCATS lived near the
forests designated by the BLM for herbicide spraying. Many plaintiffs
worked in the forests as well as used them for recreation and food
gathering."i The BLM proposed to apply the herbicides aerially by means
of a helicopter, or alternatively by means of a tanker truck or backpacks.1 2
Aerially applied herbicides are apt to drift upon non-target zones.' 3 Thus,
if the herbicides are toxic to humans, the potential for significant adverse
effects on the human environment increases when the herbicides are
aerially sprayed in populated areas.1 4
In its 1978 PEIS, the BLM devoted fifteen pages to the human health
effects of Silvex but did not address the human health effects of its other
proposed herbicides. Subsequently, the EPA suspended the use of Silvex.
Although the BLM discontinued the use of Silvex, it continued to use 2,4-D
and other herbicides without discussing their effects in any supplemental
EA.15 The Ninth Circuit focused on this discrepancy when it determined
the inadequacy of the BLM's entire environmental analysis-in SOCATS.
III. THE ISSUES
The BLM raised three issues on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The first
10. Id. at 917.
1I. SOCATS v. Watt, No. 79-1098FR (D. Or. Sept. 9, 1982).
12. Id.
13. Norris, supra note 7, at 199. A "non-target zone" is an area which is not intentionally
sprayed with herbicide.
14. The risk of harm from chemicals is measured by hazard and toxicity. "Toxicity" is the
capability of a substance to harm a living organism by chemical action. "Hazard" is the probability
that harm will result. Thus, a chemical may be highly toxic, but if it never comes into contact with
humans it maybe termed "safe" because the potential for exposure is low. See generally, Norris, supra
note 7.
Toxicity may be acute or chronic. Acute toxicity is an immediate response of an organism to one or
more large doses of a chemical. Chronic toxicity is a slower response of an organism from prolonged
exposure to a chemical. Norris, supra note 7, at 198. The BLM also briefly described the effects of
herbicides in the water supply in its final EIS, Vegetation Management with Herbicides, Western
Oregon, at 3-93 (1978).
Aerially applied herbicides also offer the greatest opportunity for the chemicals to enter aquatic
zones. If the herbicide lands on surface waters or in ephemeral stream channels, it may potentially
produce high chemical concentrations and acute toxic effects by creating a pulse of chemical contact
with an organism. Norris, supra note 7, at 202.
15. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1477.
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was whether the worst case regulation required the agency to prepare a
worst case analysis when the impacts from the spraying program, in the
agency's opinion, were unlikely to cause significant adverse impacts on the
human environment."6 Essentially, the BLM argued it did not have to
mention any uncertainty that surrounded the herbicides' relative safety
because it believed adverse effects were unlikely.
Secondly, the BLM asserted it could rely on the EPA's registration of
the herbicides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act 17 (FIFRA) and, therefore, did not need to prepare a worst case
analysis.' 8 The BLM contended that since one agency had decided that use
of a herbicide was acceptable, it need not go through another analysis of
that herbicide. The BLM maintained that FIFRA registration was the
functional equivalent of an EIS for the use of a particular herbicide.' 9
Finally, the BLM argued that the worst case regulation applied only
to EISs and not to the supplemental EAs.20 In support of this theory, it
relied on language in the regulation which referred to an agency's duty to
disclose scientific uncertainty in an environmental impact statement.2'
The BLM assumed this meant that the regulation applied only to EISs.
Despite the BLM's arguments, the Ninth Circuit held for the
plaintiffs on each issue. On the first issue, the court held the potential for
adverse impacts, rather than the agency's own beliefs, called for a worst
case analysis.22 Next, the court held the BLM could not rely on a
herbicide's FIFRA registration because FIFRA and NEPA had different
standards of review.23 Thirdly, the court held an agency had a continuing
duty to evaluate information pertinent to its original EIS.' 4 Since an EA
was the most efficient means of evaluating new information, the EA was
the most appropriate document for the worst case analysis.25
IV. ANALYSIS
NEPA is a procedural, prospective statute which mandates full
disclosure of potential consequences of agency decisions.26 Its purpose is to
force agencies to evaluate the potential future impact of their actions and
16. Id. at 1479.
17. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136, 136a-136y (1982).
18. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1479-80.
19. Brief for Petitioner at 15, SOCATS v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 446 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1984) (No. 84-267).
20. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1480.
21. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22.
22. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1479.
23. Id. at 1480.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974).
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to use ecological information in their planning processes.17 The worst case
regulation was promulgated in 1979 by the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) under NEPA authority.2 8 The regulation emphasizes the
need for full disclosure when an agency decides to proceed with its
proposed action in the face of uncertainty.2 9 The CEQ promulgated the
regulation in response to agency non-compliance with the full disclosure
mandate.30 Agencies had avoided discussing potential adverse impacts
under the guise of speculation and scientific uncertainty in order to diffuse
negative public reaction to their proposed plans.31
The worst case regulation addresses the problem of how an agency is
to proceed when information, essential to a reasoned choice among
alternatives, is either incomplete or unavailable. First the agency must try
to obtain the missing information. 2 If this proves impossible either
because of exorbitant costs or simply because the information does not
exist, the agency must weigh the need to proceed with its action against the
risk and severity of resultant adverse impacts.3 3 Only if the agency decides
to proceed in the face of uncertainty must it prepare a worst case analysis. 34
In SOCA TS, the BLM did not contest the district court's findings that
scientific uncertainty existed concerning the adverse impacts of herbicides
on human health. 5 Rather, the agency argued that it did not have to
comply with the regulation on a procedural basis. It sought to avoid
preparation of a worst case analysis by alternatively arguing that 1) it
believed that the herbicides were safe and a worst case was unlikely to
occur, 2) the EPA had assessed the herbicides' safety and therefore it was
unnecessary for the BLM to do so, and 3) even if the herbicides' safety was
questionable, a worst case analysis was required only in an EIS, not in the
EAs.
A. The Need for a Worst Case Analysis
The court was correct in stating that the existence of potential
significant adverse impacts, rather than the agency's belief those impacts
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982).
28. NEPA authorized the CEQ to promulgate regulations to implement NEPA policy. 42
U.S.C. § 4344 (1982). The Supreme Court has held that CEQ regulations are binding on
administrative agencies and are entitled to substantial deference by the courts. Andrus v. Sierra Club,
442 U.S. 347 (1979). The CEQ has explained the purpose of the worst case analysis in The Forty Most
Asked Questions Concerning CEQs NEPA Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18032 (1980).
29. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22.
30. Sigler v. Sierra Club, 695 F.2d 957, 973, n.13 (5th Cir. 1983).
31. Id.
32. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a).
33. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b).
34. Id.
35. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1478.
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were improbable, required the preparation of a worst case analysis.3 6 The
probability of a worst case occurrence is a separate issue, to be addressed by
rating the likelihood of the occurrence. The worst case regulation specifi-
cally provided for a probability analysis in order not to place undue
emphasis on the worst case scenario." Even though the worst case was
unlikely to happen, the agency could not avoid discussing the situation if
that situation could reasonably occur.3 8 Since the BLM's scientists
admitted a safe threshold of toxicity had not been established, the court
found scientific uncertainty existed.39 Under the worst case regulation, the
BLM was required to disclose this uncertainty regardless of its own faith in
the safety of herbicides. If the BLM believed damage to human health
from 2,4-D was unlikely, it was free to note this unlikelihood in a
probability analysis.
The SOCATS court relied primarily on two decisions when it
addressed the need for a worst case analysis. The first case, Sierra Club v.
Sigler,'40 was a Fifth Circuit decision from Texas. The second case, Village
of False Pass v. Watt,41 arose in the United States District Court of
Alaska. Both cases involved the need for worst case analysis of oil spills.
In Sigler, the Fifth Circuit required the Army Corps of Engineers to
prepare a worst case analysis of an oil spill by a supertanker in an
ecologically sensitive estuary. The occurrence of such an oil spill was of low
probability, but would produce disastrous results if it occurred. The
uncertainty revolved around the "likelihood, scope and consequences" of
such a massive oil spill. 42 The court determined that the remoteness of the
occurrence did not bar preparation of a worst case analysis.4 It stated that
so long as such an incident could reasonably occur, the agency must
address the potential environmental damage.
44
Sigler set important precedent for SOCATS by establishing the
authority of the worst case regulation. 45 The court noted NEPA's general
36. Id. at 1479.
37. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b): "If the agency proceeds, it shall include a worst case analysis and an
indication of the probability or improbability of its occurrence." See also McChesney, "CEQ's 'Worst
Case Analysis' Rule for EISs, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10069, 10072 (1983).
38. Reasonableness has always been a limiting factor in NEPA disclosure. Trout Unlimited v.
Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1479.
40. 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983).
41. 565 F.Supp. 1123 (D.Alaska 1983), aff'd sub nom, Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d
605 (9th Cir. 1984).
42. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d at 974.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 969-972.
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mandate of environmental accountability and tied the promulgation of the
worst case regulation to a response by the CEQ to agency noncompliance
with the full disclosure policy.46 By holding remoteness did not bar
preparation of a worst case analysis, the court foreclosed the agency's
argument that it need not confront consequences it deemed unlikely.47 As
long as the worst case could reasonably result from the proposed action, the
agency had to prepare a worst case analysis.
In contrast, the district court in Village of False Pass rejected the
need for a worst case analysis because the analysis could be included at a
later point in the offshore leasing process.48 Secretary of Interior Watt
proposed leasing offshore tracts for oil and gas exploration in Alaska. Local
residents and environmental groups opposed the leasing because it would
disturb the migratory route and breeding grounds for several species of
marine animals. Although uncertainty existed as to the impact of seismic
activity and oil spills on whales and other species,4 9 Secretary Watt viewed
the uncertain information as unimportant for making the decision to lease
the tracts.50
The district court accepted the Secretary's decision regarding oil
spills because the court concluded a massive oil spill could not reasonably
occur at the leasing stage.51 However, the court disagreed the impact of
seismic activity on whales was unimportant at the leasing stage, and gave
the Secretary the choice of supplying the missing information or preparing
a worst case analysis.52 The Secretary chose to prepare a supplemental
statement which restricted the seasons and methods of operation for
seismic exploration.53
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. The
court held the Secretary did not abuse his discretion by delaying further
consideration of the missing information. 54 He could consider that infor-
mation at a future date when he had to prepare another EIS at the
exploration and development stages.55
46. Id. at 969, 973.
47. Id. at 974.
48. The court stated that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356
(1982) divided oil and gas leasing into three stages: leasing, exploration, and development and
production. Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. at 1132. An EIS was required at each stage.
Since an oil spill could not occur at the leasing stage, a worst case analysis was not required until the
exploration stage.
49. Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F. Supp. at 1150, 1151.
50. Id. at 1152.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1153.
53. Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d at 612.
54. Id. at 616.
55. Id.
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Canby noted that the majority ignored
the practical ramifications of its decision. While the Secretary may legally
suspend or cancel a lease once it is issued, his absolute discretion not to
lease a tract is lost. 56 In other words, if the Secretary considers the potential
adverse impacts of the worst case before proceeding with the proposed
action, he still has the choice not to lease and not to begin a chain of
exploration and development events. Once the leasing and exploration
processes begin, it becomes increasingly difficult, from a practical stand-
point, for the agency to extricate itself from its decision. 57 If the purpose of
the worst case regulation is to force an agency to consider the consequences
of proceeding in the face of uncertainty, it makes more sense for the agency
to consider the potential worst case before it embarks on a course of action,
rather than later when the agency has less freedom to back out of its
decision.
The SOCATS court was strongly influenced by the district court's
decision in Village of False Pass, which held the Department of Interior's
treatment of seismic activity on whale populations in the EIS was
inadequate.58 Due to the fact scientific uncertainty existed concerning the
extent and likelihood of adverse impacts on the environment, the court
indicated the agency had to disclose this information gap.59 This disclosure
assured the public that the agency had considered the negative ramifica-
tions of its proposed action.
B. FIFRA Registration and the Need for Independent Research
The BLM's argument that the EPA's registration of herbicides under
56. Id. at 617.
57. Id. at 619. See also Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409,1414 (D.C. Cir. 1983). This case
involved the Department of Interior's issuance of oil and gas leases in the Targhee and Bridge-Teton
National Forests without preparation of an EIS. The Department issued the leases after making a
Finding of No Significant Impact. The Department determined there would be no significant adverse
environmental impacts because of restrictive stipulations placed in the leases. The Sierra Club argued
that the Department could not prevent adverse environmental impacts, but only condition the
exploration activities. Therefore, significant environmental disturbance would occur and an EIS must
be prepared. The court agreed and stated, "[t]he appropriate time for preparing an EIS is prior to a
decision, when the decisionmaker retains a maximum range of options." [Emphasis in original].
More recently, the Ninth Circuit, in a decision by Judge Hatfield, set aside a Department of
Interior decision issuing oil and gas leases in the Flathead and Gallatin National Forests. Conner v.
Burford, No. CV-82-42-BU (9th Cir. March 13, 1985) (order granting Summary Judgment). The
Department failed to complete an EIS for the proposed leasing, arguing that restrictive stipulations in
the leases would render environmental impacts insignificant. In dismissing the Department's
argument, the court stated that use of the stipulations "as a mechanism to avoid an EIS when issuing
numerous leases on potential wilderness areas circumvent[ed] the spirit of NEPA." Id. at 4.
58. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1479. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Village of False Pass had not
yet been issued at the time of the SOCATS appellate review. Therefore, the SOCATS court only
considered the Village of False Pass district court's treatment of the case.
59. Id.
[Vol. 6
SOCATS
FIFRA precluded any specific analysis of herbicide safety was misplaced.
FIFRA involves a cost-benefit analysis, whereas NEPA requires informa-
tion gathering and disclosure.60 A pesticide registered under FIFRA may
cause acute toxic effects on humans, but still be highly effective for its
intended use. 6 The data upon which registration is based is derived from a
general environmental standard rather than site specific analysis.62 The
purpose of NEPA, on the other hand, is to provide information which is site
specific to the proposed action and its environmental consequences.6 3
While FIFRA initially evaluates a pesticide's effectiveness vis-a.-vis its cost
to the environment, NEPA discusses how that pesticide will effect a
specific area of intended use. If the BLM had been allowed to rely on
FIFRA registration, it would have circumvented the NEPA full disclosure
requirement. It was essential for the BLM to anticipate and describe the
effect of 2,4-D and the other herbicides on the human environment of
southern Oregon.
The SOCATS court did not support its holding on the FIFRA
registration with a detailed analysis. It merely stated, "[t]he BLM must
assess independently the safety of the herbicides that it uses."64 Such a
broad holding, albeit correct, cannot guide future agency decisions
concerning the necessity for preparing a worst case analysis. Did this mean
each agency had to become its own expert in every field in which it lacked
knowledge? Could it ever share data? The court never addressed these
questions, perhaps assuming that common sense would temper these
extreme results. The court may also have implicitly relied on NEPA
language and CEQ regulations which seem to preclude those results by
their emphasis on agency cooperation and reduction of paperwork.6 5
60. In order to register a pesticide under FI FRA, the EPA looks at data involving the anticipated
extent of use and amount of exposure to humans and the environment in general. 7 U.S.C. §
136a(c)(2)(A) (1976).-The EPA then weighs economic standards (national volume of use, impact of
the cost of meeting environmental quality standards) against the benefits of the use. Id. NEPA merely
directs the agency to disclose the effects of use of a particular pesticide. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
Registration goes to the usefulness of the chemical while NEPA disclosure goes to the chemical's
impact on a specific human environment.
61. A pesticide which is highly toxic will be classified for restricted use. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d). The
restricted use classification reflects a determination that "the acute dermal or inhalation toxicity
presents a hazard to the applicator or other persons" or that use of the chemical "without additional
regulatory restriction may cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment ... " 7 U.S.C. §
136a(d)(B)(i),(ii).
62. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(A).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
64. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1480.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); "Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible federal
official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any federal agency which has jurisdiction by law
or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."
" 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4(n). To reduce paperwork, "[A]n agency may adopt appropriate environmen-
tal documents prepared by another agency."
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The SOCATS court's holding has since been clarified by the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark.61 Save Our Ecosys-
tems was a consolidation of two suits brought against the BLM and Forest
Service to enjoin herbicide spraying in the forests of western Oregon. The
Forest Service argued the lower court had required the agency to perform
original research in the field of herbicide safety. The Ninth Circuit
disagreed and mentioned a number of options the agency could choose if it
preferred not to do original research.67 The agency could consider the
EPA's data within the specific context of its spraying program, or require
chemical companies to provide such data and research. 8 Alternatively, the
agency could commission studies by outside consultants or conduct its own
studies.69 The bottom line was an agency must evaluate the environmental
impacts of its actions. It could not extrapolate another agency's data from
another area because NEPA requires a site specific analysis."
C. Placement of the Worst Case Analysis in an Environmental
Assessment
The BLM's final argument was the worst case regulation technically
applied to only a full EIS rather than to supplemental EAs. 7 1 Since the
BLM's original PEIS, prepared in 1978 before the effective date of the
worst case regulation, had been deemed adequate at the time, the BLM
thought it could skirt the worst case requirement. In support of its position,
the BLM noted that the regulation referred only to "environmental impact
statements" and not to "environmental assessments. 72
The SOCA TS court flatly rejected this theory, stating, "[T] he label of
the document is unimportant. We review the sufficiency of the environmen-
tal analysis as a whole."'7' The court determined the BLM's overall
environmental analysis was inadequate because it never specifically
addressed the human health effects of the herbicides sprayed. The court
also noted the agency's continuing duty to provide new environmental
66. 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 1247.
68. id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. An environmental assessment (EA) is a brief, concise document designed for disclosure of
environmental impacts. It is similar to an EIS but less lengthy. The EA has three functions:
1) to briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an EIS;
2) to aid an agency's compliance with NEPA when no EIS is necessary;
3) to facilitate preparation of an EIS when one is required.
The Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18037
(1981).
72. SOCATS, 720 F.2d at 1480.
73. Id.
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information, particularly when the agency's proposed action was an
ongoing concern.74
This holding represented a great victory for conservationists because
it stressed the substantive policies of NEPA rather than procedural
niceties. The court emphasized the informational value of the agency's
documents not as an end in itself, but as a tool for making responsible
decisions. This, of course, is the purpose of NEPA.
Ultimately... it is not better documents but better decisions that
count .... The NEPA process is intended to help public officials
make decisions that are based on understanding of environmen-
tal consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and
enhance the environment.75
V. CONCLUSION
NEPA was enacted in 1969 as "[O]ur basic national charter for
protection of the environment. ' 76 Its purpose was to force agencies to
consider the larger environmental consequences of their actions and to use
ecological information in the planning and development of their projects.77
The worst case regulation further emphasized this purpose by requiring an
agency to inform the public when uncertainty existed as to significant
adverse impacts on the human environment. In upholding the validity of
the worst case regulation, both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have agreed
that an agency must disclose scientific uncertainty regarding effects of its
proposed actions. If the agency chooses to proceed in the face of this
uncertainty, it must analyze the potential worse case and rate the
probability of its occurrence. Remoteness of such an occurrence will not
bar the preparation of a worst case analysis.78
The willingness of the Ninth Circuit to review the agency's environ-
mental analysis as a whole, rather than in a piecemeal fashion, is the
strength of SOCATS. The court directed its attention to the substantive
policies of NEPA, thus insuring the BLM will act "[A]ccording to the
letter and spirit of the Act."'79 By underscoring the BLM's ongoing duty to
evaluate and disclose information on herbicide exposure from its spraying
program, the court closed the door on agency non-compliance with
environmental accountability.
The BLM's problems in SOCA TS were largely self-imposed. Its own
reticence in confronting the potential hazards of herbicide spraying
74. Id.
75. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c).
76. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (H).
78. Sigler v. Sierra Club, 695 F.2d at 974.
79. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a).
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directly contradicted NEPA's disclosure mandate. The SOCA TS mes-
sage declares agencies cannot avoid taking a hard look at the consequences
of their actions. The agencies must be "fully aware of the impact of their
decisions when they make them.""0
80. Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. at 922.
[Vol. 6
